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Abstract: This article examines the role played by the sea in the policy of the tyrants of Pherae. 
Although it has often been emphasised that control over the port in Pagasae and the profits from 
the maritime trade were closely linked to the city’s increasing importance in the late 5th and first 
half of the 4th century, these issues are yet to be the subject of a more detailed analysis. This 
article is the first part of a comprehensive study on the maritime activity of the Pheraean tyrants 
in the period from Jason’s first documented political move to the end of the reigns of Lycophron 
and Peitholaus. It focuses on political moves, and especially on relations with Athens, as the larg-
est maritime power of the period. One of the most important instruments of maritime policy was 
maintaining a fleet. The article considers the circumstances of its building, its size and its use.
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For more than 50 years from the close of the 5th century, the rulers of Pherae with the 
aid of mercenary armies attempted to bring the whole of Thessaly under their rule.1 One 
of the results of these actions was that their country became involved in the political 
rivalry waged between Sparta, Athens, Thebes and the Macedonian kings. An explana-
tion for why Pherae ended up supporting such ambitious and expensive activities is its 
links to the sea. H. D. Westlake, author of the classic study of the history of Thessaly in 
the 4th century BCE, noted that Pherae’s proximity to the sea and control of the port in 
Pagasae “was to a large extent responsible for the swift rise of Pheraean power towards 
the close of the 5th century.” Loss of this control meant the fall of the tyranny.2 Pagasae, 
Thessaly’s only true port and described by Theopompus as epineion Pherai, must have 
1  In this article, I use the terms “the tyrants of Pherae” or “Pheraean tyrants,” which express their 
ambitions to gain rule over the whole of Thessaly. There is no doubt that they also ruled over Pherae, but we 
know almost nothing about the nature of this. On this subject, see Sprawski 2004. The paper was completed 
thanks to financial support from the Polish National Science Centre (grant: UMO-2012/07/B/HS3/03455).
2  Westlake 1935, 10–11.





been the source of the city’s major income. Pagasae had links with the family of the 
Pheraean tyrants, especially Alexander, who was even the subject of a heroic cult after 
his death.3 Although Pherae’s connections with the sea have been addressed on many oc-
casions, the question of the role it played in the tyrants’ policy has not been the subject 
of a separate study. In this article, I will attempt to answer this question by focusing on 
two major issues. The first is evidence referring to the existence and operation of the 
Pheraean fleet, known mainly because of Alexander’s pirate attacks on the Cyclades. The 
second is the relations with Athens, the largest maritime power of the period, as well as 
the rival Thebes. The chronological framework for this discussion is marked by the start 
of Jason’s rule (c. 380 BCE) at the beginning and the removal of his sons Lycophron and 
Peitholaus from Pherae (353 BCE) at the end.
Jason’s Great Plans
The oldest source on the Pheraean tyrants is a mention of a battle waged by Lycophron 
in 404 in the hope of gaining power over the whole of Thessaly. None of the other few 
references to it mentions maritime policy.4 Out of necessity, therefore, we must begin 
our analysis with the brief mention demonstrating Jason’s involvement on Euboea. This 
was also his first documented political move. According to Diodorus, a certain Neo-
genes, with the help of Jason of Pherae, assembled soldiers and occupied the citadel of 
the city of Histiaea, before taking tyrannical power over the city and the entire country.5 
We do not know any other details of Jason’s participation in these events, and we can-
not exclude the possibility that the help he provided might have been largely confined to 
financial support for the venture. We can only guess at the reasons for this involvement. 
The most obvious one appears to be the location of the city of Histiaea near a strait lead-
ing to the Euboean Channel, through which there led a safe communications route from 
north to south. As a result, sailors could avoid the eastern coast of Euboea, which was 
known to be dangerous and for its capricious weather. Those who choose that route had 
to expect a high risk of disaster. This was the location of the famous Koila, where the 
Persian fleet was destroyed in 480, as well as the headland of Kaphareus, where, accord-
ing to mythical tradition, the Achaean fleet were shipwrecked. Sailors also faced major 
obstacles in the straits between Euboea and Andros as well as Andros and Tenos. Strong 
sea currents combined with strong northern winds could block the passage completely. 
It is therefore not surprising that the route through the safe Euboean Channel was also 
preferred by sailors setting off on the long voyage from Athens towards Pontus.6 A crew 
stationed in Histiaea could also effectively block the trade route leading south from Pa-
gasae, Thessaly’s main port. This was probably the objective of the Spartans, after over-
throwing Neogenes’ tyranny, when they installed a harmost with a small squadron com-
prising three triremes there. According to Xenophon, in 377 Alketas was able to block 
3  See Boehm 2015, 209–251. 
4  Xenoph. Hell. 2.3.4. On Lycophron, see Sprawski 1999, 38–48.
5  Diod. 15.30.3.
6  Hdt. 8.13; Eurip. Helen 766–67; Constantakopoulou 2007, 25, 130; Bresson 2016, 368–369.
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a transport of grain bought by the Thebans in Pagasae. To gain an influence on shipping 
on this route, Jason might have exploited the internal tensions in Histiaea and tried to 
insert one of his trusted men there. He thereby joined the competition for the best places 
that was taking place in the Aegean world of the 4th century BCE between both stronger 
and weaker players. Even the inhabitants of little Peparethos took advantage of favour-
able conditions to attack the even weaker island of Halonessos.7
When writing about Jason’s maritime policy, we cannot fail to mention his plans 
presented by Xenophon in Hellenica. These take the form of Jason’s words quoted in 
a speech to the Spartans given by Polydamas, the leader of the Thessalian city of Pharsa-
los. It is therefore hard to determine the extent to which the opinions presented in it 
reflected Jason’s true views and plans. Analysis suggests that Xenophon was trying to 
portray Jason as an example of an ambitious ruler and good commander, who had the 
chance to do great deeds, but was defeated, murdered by assassins. He also presents him 
as a person capable of using extremely convincing arguments based on cool and logical 
analysis of the situation, and as a politician making bold and far-reaching plans.8 When 
courting Polydamas’ cooperation, Jason presents him with a vision of the greatness the 
Thessalians could acquire, united under the leadership of a well-chosen tagus. His plans 
mainly concerned building a land power that could successfully challenge the Spartan 
hegemony in Greece. Jason presents a simple alternative: the Thessalians could either be 
a hypekooi, a people that submitted to foreign leadership, or they could themselves lead 
and possess their own hypekooi. He assures Polydamas that after uniting Thessaly under 
his leadership, all the current opponents of the Spartans would seek to form an alliance 
with him. This would also apply to the Athenians:
καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι πάντα ποιήσαιεν ἂν ὥστε σύμμαχοι ἡμῖν γενέσθαι: ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἄν 
μοι δοκῶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς φιλίαν ποιήσασθαι. νομίζω γὰρ ἔτι ῥᾷον τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν ἢ τὴν κατὰ γῆν 
ἀρχὴν παραλαβεῖν ἄν.
The Athenians also, I know very well, would do anything to become allies of ours, but I do not think 
it best to establish a friendship with them; for I believe that I could obtain empire by sea even more 
easily than by land.9
In the context of potential collaboration with the Athenians, Jason spoke about do-
minion at sea—κατὰ θάλατταν ἀρχὴ. Above all, he noted that it was easier to gain pow-
er at sea than on the land. Secondly, after assuming power in Thessaly, he would have 
greater resources than the Athenians to build and maintain warships. Jason also showed 
that by controlling Macedonia he would have easier access to sources of the wood 
which the Athenians used to build their ships, and would therefore be able to build more 
than them. He then compared the potential of the two sides, showing that the Thes-
salians would find it much easier to assemble and maintain a large fleet than the Atheni-
ans, since the penestae could offer an easy source of recruits for forming the warships’ 
crews. These crews could easily be maintained thanks to surpluses in crop production, 
which, as he noted, the Athenians were forced to import. Finally, he mentioned that he 
7  Xen. Hell. 5.4.56 (Histiaea); [Dem.] 12.15 (Halonessos). See Brun 1993, 177–190; Rutishauser 2012, 
154–155; Duszyński 2016, 67–68.
8  Xen. Hell. 6.1.4–16; Wilcken 1924, 127; Sordi 1958, 176–177; Cartledge 1989, 378.
9  Xen. Hell. 6.1.10 (tr. C. L. Brownson).
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had more money than the Athenians because he reaped the benefits from the peoples 
living on the mainland, and did not look for them on the islands (καὶ χρήμασί γε εἰκὸς 
δήπου ἡμᾶς ἀφθονωτέροις χρῆσθαι μὴ εἰς νησύδρια ἀποβλέποντας, ἀλλ᾽ ἠπειρωτικὰ 
ἔθνη καρπουμένους).10 This final remark is additionally strengthened by the statement 
that the Persian king, the richest of all men, also profited from ruling on the mainland 
and not islands. This is also an introduction to Jason’s conclusion, which is the state-
ment that the power he was building would suffice to lay down a challenge to the Per-
sian king. According to the tyrant, overcoming the Great King was an easier exercise 
than imposing dominion over Greece.
The words that Xenophon puts in Jason’s mouth give the impression of a very cool 
and rational assessment of the conditions essential for gaining and maintaining hegemo-
ny at sea. This analysis is the basis for evaluating the actual power held by the strongest 
states of his time—Sparta, Athens and Persia. Jason showed that he was able to assemble 
sufficient allies to face up to Sparta. Making use of the resources of Thessaly and Mac-
edonia, with whose king he joined forces, he had no trouble raising a fleet exceeding 
Athens’ maritime force. With this power at his disposal, he was able to successfully 
challenge the Persian Empire. These final statements sound so audacious that it is hard 
to resist the impression that Xenophon wanted to emphasise the hybris of Jason, who 
had no end to his ambitions. This observation seems to be confirmed by Xenophon’s 
words contained in the second excurse on Jason, in which he presents the development 
of events after the Battle of Leuctra, when he reached the peak of his power and began to 
accomplish his plans for hegemony. The historian mentions that his killers were greeted 
with joy in Greek cities that feared Jason would become a tyrant. Death at the hands 
of assassins might seem to be a sudden turn of fate and appropriate punishment for an 
overambitious man who aspired to power on land and sea and hatched plans to subject 
the whole of Greece and even the Persian king to his rule.11
Although Jason’s plans presented by Xenophon seem excessively ambitious, it is 
important to note that in unfolding his vision of the future might of Thessaly he did not 
state outright that his objective is to gain power at sea. He simply noted that this was an 
easier task than gaining dominion on the land. His comments might be more theoretical 
than real in nature. It is also worth paying attention to his words on the weakness of the 
islands. These coincide with the statements of many Athenian authors from the turn of 
the 4th century BCE, and do not necessarily result from his own reflections.12
Without doubt, towards the end of his life Jason possessed a fleet capable of offensive 
manoeuvres. We hear about it in the context of the events of the year 371 after the Battle 
of Leuctra, when the Thebans, preparing for an attack on the Spartans, enclosed in their 
camp, sent delegations to Athens and Jason with a request for help. Jason responded 
positively to the call from his allies, deciding on a quick march to Boeotia with a unit of 
mercenaries and cavalry. At the same time, writes Xenophon, he manned triremes (εὐθὺς 
τριήρεις μὲν ἐπλήρου) to support the Boeotians at sea (ὡς βοηθήσων κατὰ θάλατταν).13
10  Xen. Hell. 6.1.10–12; νησύδρια, see Underhill 1900, 222. 
11  Xen. Hell. 6.4.27–32; Westlake 1935, 100–101; Grey 1989, 163–165.
12  See Isocr. 4.132, 136; 8.118; Brun 1993, 165–183.
13  Xen. Hell. 6.4.21. 
The Maritime Policy of the Tyrants of Pherae 93
We find no information in the sources on the number of warships Jason possessed in 
371 and their date of construction. It seems unlikely that he could have rebuilt his fleet 
during the King’s Peace. Its conditions are thought to have included a clause ordering 
the dissolution of the fleet. This is suggested by a reference to such a clause in the treaty 
from 371 that renewed the previous pact.14 It is hard to imagine that Jason would have 
dared to so flagrantly violate the conditions of the treaty by developing his armada. More 
likely is the possibility that he did this only after the outbreak of the Boeotian War in 
378. This interpretation is supported by Polydamas’ speech in Xenophon’s Hellenica, 
in which, describing Jason’s might in 375, he says nothing about his fleet. He only men-
tions that Jason was ready to expand his forces using wood imported from Macedonia as 
well as the penestae, among whom he planned to recruit crews. Therefore, if he indeed 
implemented a project of building of warships, he could only have done this after bring-
ing the whole of Thessaly under his control, which must have happened in late 375 or 
early 374. According to Xenophon, after being elected tagus he set about rebuilding his 
military powers. Diodorus also places Jason’s alliance with the Macedonian king Amyn-
tas in the course of events commenced by the Thessalians entrusting him with command 
over all the forces.15 It may have been this alliance that provided him with access to the 
raw materials needed for building warships. It therefore seems that the most likely time 
when he could have expanded his fleet was 373–371.
The time when Jason might have developed his fleet overlaps with the period when 
he pursued closer political relations with Athens. According to Xenophon, in 375 Poly-
damas assured the Spartans that Jason had been critical about the possibility of forming 
an alliance with them. Yet in autumn 373 Jason appeared in person in Athens to testify 
together with Alketas, king of Epirus, in a trial on behalf of the Athenian commander 
Timotheus. At this time, according to Apollodorus, both rulers were allies of the Athe-
nians (συμμάχων ὄντων).16 There has been much debat about the question of Jason’s 
belonging to the Second Athenian League, beginning in the late 19th century with a pro-
posal to reconstruct his name in the place of a rasura on a list of the states that joined the 
alliance. Epigraphically, we cannot entirely rule out the legitimacy of such a reconstruc-
tion. But in what respect would Jason appear in the league—as a tyrant of Pherae or as 
tagus of the Thessalians? Given Jason’s great efforts to legitimise his position with his 
election as tagus, it seems doubtful that this name should appear on the stele, and not 
the name Thessalians. For the same reason, it seems even less likely that he would have 
appeared in the name of Pherae, thereby underlining his tyrannical rule in the city. If he 
led Pherae to join the alliance, then it should be the name of the Pheraeans that appears 
on the stele, as F. W. Mitchell has proposed. A solution to this problem may also lie in 
adopting J. Cargill’s suggestion that Jason never joined the Second Athenian League, 
but formed a bilateral alliance with the Athenians.17 Accepting this solution allows us 
14  Xen. Hell. 6.3.18.
15  Xen. Hell. 6.1.11; Diod. 15.60.2. Diodorus incorrectly places the assumption of rule over Thessaly, 
subjugation of the local peoples and alliance with Amyntas after the Battle of Leuctra, see Sprawski 1999, 
79–80.
16  Xen. Hell. 6.1.10; [Dem.] 49.10; Nepos Timoth. 4.2–3.
17  IG II2 43, l. 111= R&O 22, l. 111; Cargill 1981, 83–89; Mitchell 1984, 50–58. For earlier discussion, 
see Sprawski 1999, 82–93; Buckler 2003, 252.
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to bypass the problem of looking for his name on the aforementioned stele, although it 
leaves the unanswered question of whose name this alliance was formed in. The problem 
is significant as we find no other confirmation that the Athenians were united by an alli-
ance with the Thessalians or Pheraeans before they allied with Alexander of Pherae, as 
shall be discussed below.
Although it is not easy to define the nature of the ties connecting Jason with Athens, 
there is no doubt that his relations with Timotheus were so strong that he decided to 
travel to attend his trial. They may have become close on the occasion of Timotheus’ 
warfare on the Ionian Sea in 375. As a result, the general occupied Korkyra and was vic-
torious over the Spartan fleet in the Battle of Alyzia. Many states of Western Greece—
Korkyra, Kephalenia and Akarnania—followed his example and joined the alliance with 
the Athenians. After an unsuccessful attempt at renewed peace in 373, the Athenians 
sent a unit by land westward under the command of Ktesikles to recommence the war. 
They obtained the agreement of Alketas, ruler of the Molossians, to pass through their 
territory, as well as help in crossing over to Korkyra. It may have been during these bat-
tles that Alketas joined the Second Athenian League. Given his links with Jason, it is 
probable that the Thessalian tyrant was involved in these events. Although the sources 
contain no information on this subject, there is conjecture that before arriving in Epirus, 
Ktesikles’ unit marched through the territories controlled by Jason. It is notable that 
Jason and Alketas retained close ties with Timotheus, who at this time was placed in 
charge of a fleet setting sail to help Korkyra. But before he could depart for the West, he 
was forced to sail around the Aegean Sea to man his warships and collect money to fund 
the campaign. The delay caused concern and dissatisfaction among the Athenians, who 
stripped him of command and put him on trial, which took place in late 373.18
The fact that Jason travelled to Athens in person to testify on Timotheus’ behalf sug-
gests that supporting his career was important to him. Moreover, we know that Jason 
furthered his relations with the Thebans by seeking personal contacts with their eminent 
citizens Pelopidas and Epaminondas.19 He may have exploited the institution of ritua- 
lised friendship in a similar way to maintain ties with Timotheus. It is interesting that the 
description of Jason’s arrival at the home of the Athenian politician gives the impression 
of a very informal visit. The unprepared host had to hurriedly borrow sheets, coats, two 
silver bowls and money from the banker Pasion in order to accommodate his guests.20 
Jason appeared in Athens as somebody who did not have to prepare his visit ahead of 
time, yet still felt safe in the city. He no doubt expected the Athenians to be welcoming. 
His words quoted by Xenophon and cited above on the Athenians’ readiness to form 
an alliance also betray a similar confidence that they were sympathetic towards him 
(καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι πάντα ποιήσαιεν ἂν ὥστε σύμμαχοι ἡμῖν γενέσθαι).21 The 
question arises here whether we can rule out that Apollodorus was mistaken in writing 
that during Timotheus’ trial Jason was an ally of Athens. We know from his words that 
Alketas was also one, and Apollodorus always mentions his name first. In Alketas’ case, 
however, we have evidence confirming his alliance with Athens. His name is found on 
18  Xen. Hell. 6.2.9–13; Diod. 15.46.3, 47.2–3; Buckler 2003, 264–265.
19  Plut. Pelop. 28.3–4; Mor. 193 B, 583 F; Aelian, VH 11.9. 
20  [Dem.] 49.22–24.
21  Xen. Hell. 6.1.10.
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the stele among other allies, and Xenophon confirms his support for Ktesikles’ detach-
ments. In Jason’s case, there were no such testimonies. Apollodorus may have made an 
error because although Jason was not bound by a formal alliance, he was seen as a friend 
of the Athenians. Mindful of this situation, Xenophon quotes his real or supposed words 
explaining what plans stopped him from making a formal alliance.
We know more about the formal relations between Jason and the Boeotians. Ac-
cording to Polydamas’ speech, the Boeotians and others fighting with the Spartans were 
his allies (καὶ μὴν Βοιωτοί γε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι Λακεδαιμονίοις πολεμοῦντες 
ὑπάρχουσί μοι σύμμαχοι) and were willing to acknowledge his leadership if he freed 
them from Spartan domination. The alliance must still have been in operation during 
the Battle of Leuctra. Xenophon mentions that he was an ally of the Thebans when they 
sent emissaries to him requesting help (πρὸς μέντοι Ἰάσονα, σύμμαχον ὄντα, ἔπεμπον 
σπουδῇ οἱ Θηβαῖοι, κελεύοντες βοηθεῖν). Diodorus, whose version of the order of events 
is different, writes of the arrival of an allied contingent of Thessalians. Unlike in the case 
of Athens, here we have testified rapid military aid for an ally. Jason sent an equestrian 
unit, his mercenaries and triremes to Leuctra.22
The Boeotian campaign is the first confirmed evidence of use of the Pheraean fleet. 
It is unclear, however, what tasks it was supposed to carry out. Leuctra is in the southern 
part of Boeotia, nearer to the Gulf of Corinth. The Pheraean fleet could therefore provide 
support for the units marching to the battlefield only during their passage through Ther-
mopylae. We hear nothing about Sparta’s maritime forces being active in the Euboean 
Channel in 371, so they were probably not a potential opponent. There has also been 
various conjecture on this issue. Some people have suggested that the purpose of the 
fleet might have been to ensure the neutrality of Athens, which was very lukewarm in its 
reaction to news of the Thebans’ victory at Leuctra and refused them support in further 
battles with Sparta. Others have pointed to the desire to mislead the Phocians, who were 
hostile to the Thessalians. This is because Xenophon writes that Jason manned his tri-
remes as if intending to support the Boeotians at sea (ὁ δ᾽ εὐθὺς τριήρεις μὲν ἐπλήρου, 
ὡς βοηθήσων κατὰ θάλατταν). The fleet was evidently supposed to divert the attention of 
the Phocians, allowing him to pass quickly through their territory before they managed 
to react.23
A hint regarding the maritime objectives of Jason’s activities might be provided by 
his conduct during the time of the entire Boeotian campaign. On the way to Leuctra, he 
moved fast, forestalling the reaction of potential enemies. Despite reporting in person 
with his unit at Leuctra, he did not intend to join the battle, but brought about a truce. 
On his return journey to Thessaly, Jason conducted one more action that might have 
been connected to his activities at sea—he destroyed Heraclea in Trachis, which lay 
close to the northern entrance to Thermopylae. According to Xenophon, he did this 
so that nobody would be able to stop him if he intended to head to southern Greece.24 
Thucydides also notes another aspect of the strategic location of this city. Describing 
the circumstances of its situation, he emphasises that the Spartans chose this place not 
22  Xen. Hell. 6.4.20–22; Diod. 15.54.5. 
23  Westlake 1935, 92; Mandel 1980, 69; Mitchell 1984, 54; Tuplin 1993, 118; Sprawski 1999, 96, 
note 240.
24  Xen. Hell. 6.4.27. 
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only because it lay on the road to Thrace, but because it was easy to prepare a fleet for 
an attack on nearby Euboea from there.25 The Spartans therefore also had the intention 
to set up a base for their fleet close by when they established Heraclea. When making 
his claims to rule over the sea communications route along the western coast of Euboea, 
Jason took the opportunity to destroy a foothold for potential rivals.
Jason’s warships sailing in the Malian Gulf must have been highly visible for many 
local inhabitants. They were a clear signal that Jason possessed the necessary forces and 
was determined to play the role of hegemon in the region.26
Alexander between Thebes and Athens
Jason’s death in 370 destabilised the political situation in Thessaly, opening the next 
chapter of domestic rivalry and foreign interventions. Both Jason’s successors and the 
Thessalian cities relying on them were searching for outside support. In the 360s, both 
the Thebans and the Athenians, who in 369 finally became fierce rivals, were willing 
to offer such support. The Athenians redirected their policy significantly, forming an 
alliance with Sparta, hitherto their main rival, against Thebes. At the same time, prob-
ably still in 369, they commenced military efforts to regain Amphipolis, sending a fleet 
under the command of Iphikrates to the North.27 This was a time when the Second Athe-
nian League was weakened, as several states followed Thebes in leaving it. Yet the al-
liance survived, as its existence delivered many tangible benefits. The Athenian fleet 
patrolling the Aegean Sea had a major influence on guaranteeing the safety of ships, 
contending with pirates and aiding the development of maritime trade.28
The rivalry between Athens and Thebes also affected the North, which was reflected 
in a sequence of short-lived alliances formed by these states with rival factions among 
both the Thessalians and the Macedonians. In Thessaly’s case, source information is 
limited, and it is therefore hard to build a logical and coherent picture of the evolution 
of these relations. It sometimes seems that almost every year brought a change, which 
makes it difficult to determine whether the parties were allied at a given moment, or their 
ties had been broken. The conclusion is, therefore, that this surprising fragilty and inef-
fectiveness of these alliances resulted not only from the complicated internal situation, 
but also to a great extent from the inconsistent policy of Athens and Thebes, for which 
this was not the most important area of activity.29
After Jason’s death, his brothers Polydorus and Polyphron took power in Thessaly 
without great difficulty. Soon after, Polydorus was killed by his brother, who assumed 
full power. It was presumably to him that the summons arrived from Thebes to join an 
expedition against Sparta. According to Xenophon, in winter 370/369, when Epami-
nondas set off for the Peloponnese, he was supported by the Phocians, Euboeans from 
25  Thuc. 3.92.4. 
26  Xen. Hell. 6.4.27. Cf. Larsen 1960, 231–234; Tuplin 1993, 119, note 50.
27  Aesch. 2.27; Buckler 2003, 354–355.
28  Cawkwell 1981, 47–48.
29  See Cloché 1935, 123; Kallet 1983, 242–243.
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all cities, Locrians, Heracleans and Malians. Cavalry and light infantry from Thessaly 
also participated in the expedition.30 This might indicate that Polyphron preserved the 
alliance with the Thebans formed by Jason. Westlake points out that the way Xenophon 
mentions the Thessalian forces at Epaminondas’ side shows that they might not have 
been units of the Thessalian League, but rather mercenaries.31 It seems likely that they 
may have been detachments formed by Jason, who came under Polyphron’s pay after 
Jason’s death. By confirming the alliance with the Thebans, Polyphron also strengthened 
his position in the land. During his brief reign, he had Polydamas and eight of the most 
influential citizens of Pharsalos murdered. Xenophon presents these events as an exam-
ple of the transformation of the rule of tagus into tyranny.32 The fact that Polydamas had 
previously declared himself as a Spartan ally might have led to doubts over his loyalty 
and resulted in the need to deal with him.33
In summer 369, Polyphron was murdered by his nephew Alexander, who assumed 
power in Pherae and the rank of tagus.34 His actions met with immediate opposition from 
some Thessalians. The Larisseans called upon Alexander II of Macedon for help, and 
he responded with a surprise incursion to Thessaly, setting up garrisons in Larissa 
and Crannon.35 Also called upon to intervene were the Thebans, who, according to Dio-
dorus, were asked to liberate the Thessalians from Alexander’s tyranny.36 The Theban 
forces invaded Thessaly, led by Pelopidas. He negotiated the Macedonians’ withdrawal 
from the occupied cities, as well as mediating between Alexander and his opponents. 
According to Plutarch, who had a hostile attitude towards Alexander, Pelopidas “tried 
to make him, instead of a tyrant, one who could govern the Thessalians mildly and ac-
cording to law” (ποιεῖν ἐκ τυράννου πρᾷον ἄρχοντα τοῖς Θεσσαλοῖς καὶ νόμιμον).37 On 
this basis, we can assume that his objective was not to remove Alexander, but only to 
alleviate the conflict in Thessaly. It was possibly then that the Thessalian koinon was 
reorganised, proposing Alexander a new position instead of the rank of tagus. Alexan-
der broke off the negotiations as he was unhappy with their progress, which in practice 
entailed open conflict with Thebes. Yet he was unprepared for this, and after few battles 
decided to make a compromise. The situation in Thessaly was under control to the extent 
that Pelopidas was able to set off to Macedonia, where he supported Alexander II against 
his rival Ptolemy, forming an alliance with him. After dealing with affairs in Thessaly 
and Macedonia, he returned to Boeotia.38
Unsuccessful in gaining the support of Thebes in 369, Alexander of Pherae was 
forced to look for another ally. The only choice was the Athenians, who at this time had 
revived their policy towards the North. In spring 368 their interest in the situation in 
Thessaly was so great that they wanted to send mercenaries dispatched by Dionysius, 
30  Xen. Hell. 6.5.23. Diodorus (15.62.4) mentions only the Locrians and Phocians.
31  Westlake 1935, 128–129.
32  Xen. Hell. 6.4.34.
33  Xen. Hell. 6.1.4.
34  Xen. Hell. 6.4.34–35.
35  Diod. 15.61.2–5.
36  Diod. 15.67.3. See Westlake 1935, 132–133.
37  Plut. Pelop. 26 (tr. B. Perrin).
38  Buckler 2003, 321–323.
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tyrant of Syracuse, there. These units were to support the coalition partners fighting 
with the Boeotians, who ultimately acceded to the judgement of the Spartans to use them 
in the Peloponnese. Suggesting sending mercenaries to Thessaly, the Athenians wanted 
to direct them against the Thebans.39 The Thebans, called upon by the Thessalian cities 
threatened by Alexander, accepted the invitation to intervene. But they did not regard 
the situation as sufficiently serious to engage armed forces, deciding instead to send 
only a delegation in the guise of Pelopidas and Ismenias to mitigate the conflict. We do 
not know the outcome of their talks, but Pelopidas felt sufficiently confident in Thessaly 
that he undertook a further intervention in Macedonia against Ptolemy, the regent after 
Alexander II’s death. Somewhat earlier, Iphikrates intervened in Macedonia, supporting 
Ptolemy and bringing about an alliance with Athens. Pelopidas dealt with matters in 
Macedonia in keeping with the Thebans’ ideas, encouraging Ptolemy to form an alli-
ance. He then returned to Thessaly, where, together with Ismenias, he was unexpectedly 
imprisoned by Alexander of Pherae.40
There is much to suggest that Alexander had a very impetuous nature and did not 
hesitate to take risky steps.41 One of these was the arrest of Pelopidas and Ismenias, 
which incurred the wrath of the Thebans and exposed him to another armed intervention 
on their part. Yet this was not necessarily the move of a desperado failing to reckon with 
realities. As mentioned above, Alexander had reasons to be profoundly disappointed 
with Pelopidas’ attitude. Despite the ties that had once connected the Theban with Ja-
son, he was now no longer inclined to offer his nephew unequivocal support. Owing to 
Pelopidas’ position, the only worthwhile force that Alexander could enlist for himself 
was the Athenians. Their efforts to send to Thessaly mercenaries dispatched with aid for 
the anti-Theban coalition by the Syracusan tyrant Dionysius demonstrated their interest 
in the situation in the region. At this time, they were still not fully on Alexander’s side, 
since they had only formed an alliance with him in the second half of 368. A hint of the 
Athenians’ objectives is given by Xenophon, who writes that in requesting that the mer-
cenaries sent by Dionysius be dispatched to Thessaly, they argued that they should be 
sent against the Thebans (ὡς χρεὼν εἴη αὐτοὺς ἰέναι εἰς Θετταλίαν τἀναντία Θηβαίοις).42 
We can therefore assume that their main objective was rather preventing the Theban in-
fluences in Thessaly from becoming stronger, rather than unequivocal support of Pherae. 
Alexander’s manoeuvre was therefore risky, but rational. In arresting Pelopidas, he pre-
sented himself unambiguously as an enemy of the Thebans. With this move he provoked 
an intervention of the Boeotian army, which he could expect in any case, but also gained 
the sympathy of the Athenians. When, receiving news of the Thebans’ preparations for 
armed intervention, he sent delegates to Athens requesting an alliance, they were warmly 
welcomed. The Athenians agreed to form a coalition and sent help in the form of 30 tri-
remes and a thousand men under the command of Autokles. The collaboration brought 
great success to both sides. Before the Athenians could reach Thessaly, Theban forces 
invaded, and after joining with local allies, the Thebans sought to settle the campaign in 
a battle. Yet their plan failed, as for unknown reasons the allies abandoned them. Alexan-
39  Xen. Hell. 7.1.28; Sordi 1958, 212–213.
40  Diod. 15.71.2–3; Plut. Pelop. 27; Heskel 1997, 40–43; Buckler 2003, 323–325.
41  On Alexander, see Sprawski 2006, 135–147; Boehm 2015, 209–251.
42  Xen. Hell. 7.1.28.
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der, meanwhile, joined forces with the Athenians and other allies. The isolated Thebans, 
lacking supplies, decided to retreat. Scourged by Alexander’s cavalry, they were only 
able to avoid complete disaster by handing command to Epaminondas, who up until then 
had served in this campaign as a rank-and-file soldier.43
The Thebans did not give up their attempts to free the prisoners, and in spring 367 
they again sent Epaminondas with major forces to Thessaly. Contrary to the hopes of 
the Thessalians, counting on Alexander’s destruction, the Thebans were very cautious 
in their warfare, as shown by one of the stratagems described by Polyaenus. Plutarch 
also emphasises that Epaminondas delayed a direct attack, trying rather to intimidate 
his opponents and dissuade them from a battle. He puts the Theban commander’s con-
duct down to his concern for the prisoners’ lives, describing the tyrant’s cruelties and 
the treacherousness of his character at length. However, Alexander proposed freeing 
the prisoners in exchange for peace. Epaminondas rejected these conditions, but agreed 
to a 30-day truce, and after the prisoners were freed immediately withdrew to Boeotia. 
Alexander enjoyed great success, escaping the confrontation with his most powerful 
opponent without losses. His position was strengthened by forming an alliance with 
Athens. In fact, the truce he concluded lasted almost three years. The Thebans must have 
been aware of the weakness of the Thessalian opposition to Alexander, and moreover, 
they involved themselves in negotiations to establish a general peace.44
In the course of the above events, the Athenians’ position towards Alexander during 
Epaminondas’ invasion is unclear. Sources say nothing about their military engagement. 
But it is hard to evaluate the situation because we know very little about the course of 
this campaign. Although it is unlikely that Alexander and the Athenians did not expect 
the Thebans’ attack, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Athenians did not manage 
to take any actions to support their ally, especially as their fleet was involved in Iphi-
krates’ manoeuvres against Amphipolis. It is also possible, however, that the mercenaries 
called up by Autokles stayed in Thessaly longer and left it only after the truce was made 
with Epaminondas.45 Leaving them in Thessaly for winter to be maintained by Alexander 
was also comfortable for the Athenians themselves. This situation seems to be confirmed 
by Plutarch, who writes that “the Athenians were taking Alexander’s pay” (Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ 
μισθοδότην Ἀλέξανδρον εἶχον).46 
We therefore have reasons to believe that nothing happened in spring 367 to put 
a strain on the alliance formed several months earlier. Despite the lack of information 
about collaboration between Alexander and Athens after 368, it appears that the alli-
ance was not formerly broken, as the Athenians only decided to demolish the stele with 
the text of this agreement in 361/360. The lack of traces of collaboration is somewhat 
frustrating given the fact that we can discern events in the changing political situation 
that should have encouraged such cooperation from both sides. The first of these was 
the Athenians’ loss of Oropos. In 366, when negotiations on the restoration of general 
peace ended in fiasco, it was controlled by a group of exiles probably with the support 
43  Dem. 23.120; Diod. 15.71.3–4; Cloché 1923, 403–406; Buckler 2003, 325–327.
44  Diod. 15.75.2; Plut. Pelop. 29.1–3; 6; Polyaenus 2.3.13; Sordi 1958, 215; Roy 1994, 195–196. For the 
chronology, see Buckler 1980, 248–249; Stylianou 1998, 450–451.
45  See Cloché 1923, 406.
46  Plut. Pelop. 31.4. (tr. B. Perrin).
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of Themison, tyrant of nearby Eretria. Keen to win back this important region, the Athe-
nians mobilised sizable forces, entrusting command to Chabrias. Before this, however, 
Theban forces commanded by Epaminondas reached Oropos. Facing such an opponent, 
Chabrias decided against fighting and withdrew his troops. By leaving Oropos in the 
hands of the Thebans, Chabrias hoped to be able to recover it through arbitration, but 
his hopes were dashed. This was a painful defeat for the Athenians. Xenophon mentions 
their great disappointment with the approach of their allies, none of whom came to their 
aid.47 It is worth noting here, however, that this is the only reference to the Athenians 
expecting help from their allies. We do not hear of them requesting it before the Battle of 
Naxos or during later battles with Alexander.48
The other issue that should have caused consternation on both sides was the expan-
sion of the Boeotian fleet and the demonstration of its might made by Epaminondas in 
spring of 364, when he led the assembled warships to the Aegean Sea. The first success 
of the Thebans was a victorious confrontation with the Athenian fleet commanded by 
Laches, which tried to stop them. We do not know the details of this confrontation, but 
Epaminondas must have felt confident facing much more experienced opponents. It may 
be that Laches, seeing his rival’s numerical advantage, withdrew without a fight. The 
Theban fleet continued its voyage without hindrance, securing gains in the form of an 
alliance with Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium. These successes made a big impression 
on the Athenians. Some twenty years later, Isocrates mentioned them when he wrote that 
the Thebans sent their warships to Byzantium as if their intention was to gain power both 
on land and at sea. We find a similar assessment of the Theban ambitions in Diodorus. 
Writing with the benefit of hindsight about Epaminondas’ campaign, he argues that if he 
had lived longer the Thebans would certainly have gained hegemony on land as well as 
at sea. If Epaminondas aspired to domination at sea, his expedition was just the first step 
in this direction. He may have been interested only in weakening the Athenians’ position 
by demonstrating that their hegemony could be challenged. Although his fleet did not 
inflict losses on the Athenians directly, its appearance might have caused a large amount 
of unrest on the Aegean Sea. Yet Epaminondas’ expedition remained an isolated venture, 
as the Thebans did not continue his bold maritime policy.49
No information survives on Alexander’s reaction to the expansion of the Boeotian 
fleet and Epaminondas’ expedition. One can only assume that he cannot have been en-
tirely indifferent to these events. According to Buckler, when Epaminondas set sail in 
early spring 364 he chose the northern route through the Malian Gulf. This route led 
through the calm waters of the Euboean Channel and allowed him to avoid Athenian 
outposts in Rhamnus.50 If the Boeotian fleet indeed chose the northern route, it sailed 
through the Malian Gulf along territories under Alexander’s rule. Whatever the route 
taken by the Boeotian fleet in 364, the very fact of its expansion must have posed a threat 
47  Xen. Hell. 7.4.1–2; Dem. 18. 99; Aesch. 2.164; 3.85; Diod. 15.76.1; Buckler 1980, 193–195.
48  Dreher 1995, 278–279.
49  Isocr. 5.53; Diod. 15.78. 4–79. 2; Plut. Phil. 14.1. On the maritime programme of Thebes, see Carrata 
Thomes 1952; Buckler 1980, 160–175; Buckler 1985, 13–15; Buckler 1998, 192–204; Heskel 1997, 131–
132, 140; Stylianou 1998, 494–496. Cf. Cawkwell 1972, 271; Ruzicka 1998, 60–69.
50  Diod. 15.79.1; Buckler 1980, 169–170, 255–259; Buckler 1985, 22; Heskel 1997, 64–65. According 
to Carrata Thomes (1952, 36–37), Epaminondas sailed into the Malian Gulf on his return journey.
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to the trade routes leading to Pagasae. In this situation, Alexander should have been 
interested in maintaining the alliance with Athens, especially given the plans to resume 
the struggle for control of the Thessalian cities. For the Athenians too, Alexander con-
trolling the convenient port in Pagasae might have been an attractive partner. But we 
have no evidence to suggest their cooperation, although both sides were very active 
at this time. There is no doubt that the Athenians were concentrating on attempts to 
regain Amphipolis. From 365, Timotheus was in command, and although he did not 
conquer Amphipolis, he had major successes in occupying Pydna and Methone. He 
then took Samos and targeted the Hellespont region, where he conquered Sestos, be-
fore setting out to the Black Sea. In 364 he sailed into Chalkidiki, where he captured 
Potidaia and Torona.51 At this time, Alexander renewed the war with the opposition 
Thessalian cities. According to Diodorus, he achieved a series of victories, inflicting 
major losses on his opponents. He was therefore able to place his garrisons in Achaea 
Phthiotis and Magnesia. He thus brought under his control an entire band of coastline 
from the Malian Gulf to the mouth of the Pineios. His successes induced the Thes-
salian opponents to call on Thebes for help.52
At the Thessalians’ request, the Thebans decided to send Pelopidas with 7,000 sol-
diers. Yet the solar eclipse on 14 July 364 was seen as a bad omen, and resulted in the 
plans being abandoned. Pelopidas decided to set off for Thessaly only in the company of 
a group of volunteers and mercenaries. At the head of these forces and the Thessalians 
supporting him, he clashed with Alexander at Cynoscephalae. Alexander endured ma-
jor losses in the battle, but thanks to Pelopidas’ death he was able to keep his position. 
Probably in autumn the same year, the weakened Alexander again had to contend with 
the main Theban forces. This time he lost and had to agree to negotiations. In the end 
he made an agreement which left Pherae in his hands, but forced him to abandon the 
Thessalian cities occupied previously and Magnesia. He also had to hand over control of 
Achaea Phthiotis to the Boeotians and form an alliance with them.53
Sources tell us nothing about the Athenians’ attitude to these events. Plutarch em-
phasises, however, that their relations with Alexander before Pelopidas’ expedition were 
very good. The Athenians apparently erected a monument to him and took money from 
him.54 Unfortunately, we do not know why they left their ally without help. Perhaps it 
was just an effect of inability to react appropriately to a situation that demanded it. In 
the 360s, Athens’ active policy encountered obstacles such as problems with collecting 
funds for financing campaigns and finding a sufficient number of experienced oarsmen 
to man their warships.55 It is also possible that Alexander was no longer attractive as an 
ally. His brutality in dealings with Thessalian cities might also have put the Athenians 
off engaging in his defence.
Forced to form an alliance with the Boeotians, Alexander had to make another rever-
sal in his policy. In early summer 362, according to Xenophon, “great numbers of Thes-
51  For the chronology, see Buckler 1980, 255–259.
52  Diod. 15.80.1; Plut. Pelop. 31.1.
53  Diod. 15.80; 81.3; Strabo 9.5.6; Nepos, Pelop. 5.2–4; Plut. Pelop. 32–35; Westlake 1935, 144–145; 
Sordi 1958, 225; Boehm 2015, 239; Heskel 1997, 67; Sprawski 2006, 144–145.
54  Plut. Pelop. 31.4.
55  See Cawkwell 1984, 335–338; Rhodes 2012, 120–121. See also Gabrielsen 1994, 107–110.
Sławomir Sprawski 102
salians, coming both from Alexander and from his opponents” (καὶ Θετταλῶν πολλοὺς 
παρά τε Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων αὐτῷ),56 fought on the Boeotian side at the Battle 
of Mantinea. Alexander must have openly opposed the Athenians, probably fulfilling the 
obligations of the agreement formed with Thebes.
Alexander’s next step was to undertake a maritime campaign against the Athenian 
allies, which ultimately earned him the view expressed by Xenophon, who called him 
“an unjust robber both by land and by sea” (ἄδικος δὲ λῃστὴς καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ 
θάλατταν).57 Diodorus gave a similar verdict on his actions, writing that he sent pirate 
ships (λῃστρίδας ναῦς ἐκπέμψας) against the Cyclades. During these raids, a number of 
islands were attacked and many people were enslaved. Among these were the island of 
Tenos, whose fate is mentioned in a speech by the Athenian rhetorician Apollodorus. We 
know from this that the Athenians debated the problem of a series of misfortunes they 
had experienced, including Alexander’s attack on Tenos, during the popular assembly 
that took place at the end of the month of Metageitnion, falling in August and September 
362. Alexander’s campaign must have taken place at the latest in the first half of August 
of that year.58
Buoyed by his successes to date and the lack of a decisive reaction from the Athe-
nians, Alexander did not stop at pirate raids, but also undertook armed interventions on 
a considerably wider scale. In 361 he attacked the island of Peparethos, lying near to 
the coast of Magnesia. Encountering resistance from its main city, Alexander decided 
to mount a regular siege. We can therefore assume that his aim was not to sack the island, 
but to establish lasting control there. This time the Athenians made a decisive counter-
attack and sent a squadron of warships under the command of Leosthenes to help.59 
Diodorus’ account shows that thanks to the rapid response, the Athenians managed to 
entrap the Thessalian forces in Panormos. Alexander did not accept defeat, but he did 
not dare to attack the Athenians immediately. It is likely that he sought support at this 
time by sending letters to the mercenary leader Charidemus of Oreus, who later main-
tained that he had not received Alexander’s envoys. We only know about this subject 
from a speech by Demosthenes, who presents Charidemus in a very unfavourable light, 
accusing him of constantly acting to Athens’ detriment. The orator suggested that Char-
demus “was found behaving exactly like Alexander’s filibusters” (τοῖς λῃσταῖς φαίνεται 
τοῖς παρ᾽ ἐκείνου ταὐτὰ πράττων). This was how he commented on his attacks on the 
Athens-friendly cities of Krithote and Elaeus on the Chersonese. Yet there is no reason 
to suppose that he collaborated with Alexander. We cannot rule out, however, as Julia 
Heskel suggests, that Alexander managed to secure mercenaries from another source, 
emboldening him to mount another attack on Panormos.60
The details of the events that led to capturing Panormos were given by Polyaenus. 
According to his description, Alexander was able to contact his men at Panormos and 
send them the order to observe the Athenians’ movements. They were supposed to in-
56  Xen. Hell. 7.5.4 (tr. C. L. Brownson); Westlake 1935, 150–152.
57  Xen. Hell. 6.4.35 (tr. C. L. Brownson).
58  [Dem.] 50.4; Diod. 15.95.1; Westlake 1935, 153; Sordi 1958, 223, note 4.
59  Diod. 15.95.1; Polyaen. 6.2.1; Heskel 1997, 69–70.
60  Dem. 23.162 (tr. A. T. Murray); Prittchett 1974, 85–86, 89; Kallet 1983, 249–250; Kelly 1990, 104–
105; Heskel 1997, 69.
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form him by beacon signals if any Athenian ships left the port. The chance for an attack 
came when Leosthenes, the commander of the Athenian fleet, decided to send warships 
to Samos, Thasos and the Hellespont, presumably requesting support. Alexander’s men 
sent a message from Panormos to Pagasae by beacon signals. The tyrant manned the 
shops and immediately set off for Peparethos. Leosthenes managed to save himself, but 
the furious Athenians put him on trial for treason, sentenced him to death and confis-
cated his property. The Athenians’ indignation was understandable given the fact that 
Alexander had exploited his unexpected success in the sea battle and attacked Piraeus. 
Not encountering resistance, his ships sailed into the main port. Nobody suspected them 
of hostile intentions, and therefore Alexander’s crew were not stopped by anyone when 
they left their vessels and set about plundering the deigma, the place where the transac-
tions took place. The traders and bankers who were there became their victims. Before 
the commanders in Athens could be informed of the attack on the port, the aggressors 
had set sail with the plundered money.61
Alexander made good use of Athens’ engagement on various fronts in 362. His attack 
on Tenos coincided with a call from Miltocythes with an offer to hand over Chersones 
in return for providing help against the Thracian king and with a call from Proconnes 
for help in the fight against Cyzicus. At the same time, the Athenians were alarmed by 
the news that the fleet carrying grain from Pontus to Piraeus had been stopped by Byz-
antium, Chalcedon and Cyzicus. For the next few seasons, the Athenians focused their 
attention on securing safe passage through the Hellespont of ships carrying grain to Pi-
raeus. Meanwhile, from 364 Timotheus led operations on Chalkidiki against Olynthus. 
All these activities put the system of mobilisation of the Athenian fleet under strain, 
causing temporary problems, as shown in Apollodorus’ speech.62
The actions taken by Alexander in this period did not pose a direct threat to Athens, 
but there is no doubt that they contributed to destabilising the situation on the Aegean 
Sea and affected Athens’ authority and maritime trade. Seeking an effective solution to 
the problem, the Athenians began negotiations with Alexander’s Thessalian enemies. 
As a result, in 360/361 the Athenians formed an alliance with the Thessalian League 
aimed against him, the resolutions of which were preserved on an inscription. The parties 
signed the agreement “forever,” committing not to conclude a peace with Alexander 
without the agreement of the others. All allies of Athens became allies of the Thes-
salians. The Athenians also undertook to demolish the stele with the text of the alliance 
once formed with Alexander. But the very fact that the stele was still standing many 
months after the evident breaking of the alliance does not provide a basis for drawing 
far-reaching conclusions. As S. Bolmarcich showed, although the agreement recorded 
on a stele was no longer valid, it was usually left. The act of destruction of such a stele 
was unusual: “it occurs as a premeditated action, meant to make a powerful political and 
diplomatic statement.” Such an act required use of the appropriate legal procedure and 
was preceded by discussion.63 Enshrining in the conditions of the agreement the deci-
sion to remove the stele with the treaty formed with Alexander was therefore a telling 
61  Polyaen. 6.2.1. On deigma, see Bresson 2016, 310.
62  Cawkwell 1984, 335–342; Sealey 1993, 91. 
63  Bolmarcich 2007, 483, 484–485 (where he refers to the clause of the demolition of the stelae with the 
agreement formed with Alexander).
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expression of the moods in Athens and the determination of the negotiating parties to 
oppose him.
The Athenians’ alliance with the Thessalian League may have curbed Alexander’s 
actions. In any case, the sources contain no information on further attacks by him. We 
also have no evidence confirming that the allies undertook joint initiatives. It is possible, 
as in the previous years, that the Athenians could not afford an armed intervention in 
Thessaly, and Alexander’s death soon removed the reason for forming an alliance. At the 
same time, the Thessalians, seeking fruitful help, turned to Philip II, who was in conflict 
with Athens. The alliance between the Thessalian League and Athens therefore did not 
last long, and a direct consequence of it could only be reinforced ties between Alexander 
and the Thebans.64
It has been suggested that the Thebans’ policy towards the Thessalians changed after 
Pelopidas’ death. They may have reached an agreement with Alexander, who proved to 
be an attractive ally for them. According to this suggestion, the effect of these closer rela-
tions was his maritime campaign. M. Sordi notes that the incursions against the Cyclades 
could only have taken place thanks to Alexander’s access to the neighbouring ports. In 
her view, these may have been the ports of the Theban allies in Argolis. At least initially, 
these raids were agreed with the Thebans and connected with the campaign in the Pelo-
ponnese.65 According to Carrata Thomes, Alexander’s fleet may have consisted of some 
of the Boeotian warships provided to him and built on the initiative of Epaminondas.66 
According to G. Kip, however, the Thebans agreed for Alexander to retake control over 
Magnesia as a reward for his participation in the Battle of Mantinea. Polyaenus suggests 
that during the Battle of Panormos he must have controlled at least its southern part.67 
Indirect proof of the rapprochement between them can also be found in a reference by 
Xenophon, who notes that towards the end of his life the tyrant was ready to abandon 
his wife as well as Jason’s daughter Thebe to unite with his predecessor’s widow, who 
lived in Thebes at the time. If Jason’s wife belonged to one of the influential families of 
Thebes, then perhaps this was an attempt on Alexander’s part to bring about closer ties 
with this city.68
In the context of reflections on the Thebans’ attitude to Alexander, the moment when 
he commenced his maritime campaign is important. If this happened after the Battle of 
Mantinea, his action can be treated as an attempt to become independent at a time when 
the Thebans’ position had become weak. It has been suggested, however, that there is 
a link between the appearance of Alexander’s fleet in the Cyclades and the anti-Athenian 
revolt that took place in Ioulis on the island of Keos. Connecting these events allows us 
to place the beginning of the maritime campaign to 363, in the period just after the alli-
64  R&O 44 with commentary; Westlake 1935, 154; Sordi 1958, 228–229, 232. Rogers (1932, 16, no. 1) 
associates the activity of the Thessalian League in the years 361–360 bronze coins with the legend ΠΕΤ-ΘΑ-
ΛΩΝ. This issue shows that the League was able to undertake military actions financed from a joint fund. 
Cf. note 38.
65  Sordi 1958, 222–223.
66  Carrata Thomes 1952, 43–44.
67  Kip 1910, 78–79.
68  Xen. Hell. 6.4.37; Westlake 1935, 152–155; Badian 1999, 111–112.
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ance with the Boeotians.69 If we accept this suggestion we must also acknowledge that 
Alexander’s fleet was immediately ready for action. It is hard to imagine that Alexander 
would have undertaken the costly actions of expanding his fleet when the extent of his 
power had been drastically reduced. It is more likely that he maintained warships before-
hand—maybe still those built by Jason. This in turn suggests that in the previous years 
the fleet was carrying out missions that allowed their upkeep to be funded and brought 
Alexander tangible benefits. These missions must have ended at the same time when 
he was forced to abandon the alliance with the Athenians. The conclusions that can be 
drawn from analysis of his policy do not indicate that he engaged in political actions 
using the fleet. If he maintained a usable fleet, therefore, perhaps he needed it for escort-
ing trading ships and fighting off the threat of pirates. Such initiatives may have been 
financed by the Athenians, and ended at the moment when he formed an alliance with 
Thebes. If Alexander was cut off from the source of this income, this might explain the 
vehemence of his reaction.
Jason’s Sons
In late 358 or early 357, Alexander was murdered by Jason’s sons Lycophron and Ti-
sophonus with the participation of Thebe, their sister and also the tyrant’s wife. Diodorus 
mentions this in a very brief relation presenting the events taking place over the years 
from the death of Alexander Pherae to the rule of Alexander the Great. This abbreviated 
presentation causes difficulties in reconstructing the chronology of these events. But it 
seems that after the successful assassination the brothers were warmly received, extolled 
as tyrannicides. Later, however, they too would become tyrants. To gain power, they paid 
off and enticed mercenaries—no doubt the same ones who had previously been in Al-
exander’s service (ὕστερον δὲ μετανοήσαντες καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους χρήμασι πείσαντες 
ἀνέδειξαν ἑαυτοὺς τυράννους).70 This presumably took place soon after the murder, still 
in 358 or at the beginning of 357, because if they did so later, it would be difficult to find 
an answer to the question of who paid the mercenaries and to what end he maintained 
them. It is therefore more likely that after a short period of uncertainty the brothers 
bought off the mercenaries and assumed power in the city. In this context, numismatics 
provides interesting evidence. Like Alexander, Tisiphonus issued bronze coins with his 
name. Bronze coins were nothing new in Thessaly, but it is worth noting that they were 
mainly used in the local market, and were often used to pay soldiers.71 The low quality 
of production of the surviving examples of these coins has been noted, which might 
point to the haste with which they were issued.72 It is possible that this resulted from the 
need to quickly gather funds for paying the mercenaries.
69  Heskel 1997, 67–70. See also Duszyński 2020.
70  Diod. 16.14.1.
71  See Rogers 1932, 167, nos. 527–530. For the use of bronze coins for military payment, see Psoma 
2009, 3–38; Sheedy 2015, 203–223.
72  Triton XV: 290, nos. 709–711.
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According to Diodorus, after Jason’s sons assumed tyrannical rule, they were op-
posed by the Aleuadae from Larissa, who, without sufficient forces, called upon the Ma- 
cedonian king Philip for help. The question of the chronology of Philip II’s interven-
tion in Thessaly has been discussed on numerous occasions. There seem to be serious 
grounds to conclude that the first of these took place just after Alexander’s death, i.e. sev-
eral years before he involved himself in fighting with the Phocians and brought about the 
abolition of tyranny in Pherae. It is most likely that Philip came at the behest of Larissa, 
which was alarmed by Jason’s sons’ assumption of control over Alexander’s mercena- 
ries, and de facto the creation of tyrannical rule in Pherae. Philip, like his elder brother 
earlier, probably intervened in defence of the Aleuadae from Larissa. Yet he was not will-
ing to remove the tyrants from Pherae. His objective may have in fact been to alleviate 
the conflict in Thessaly and form personal ties with its leaders. This was the purpose of 
his two marriages with Thessalian women: Philinna from Larissa and, tellingly, Jason’s 
niece Nicesipolis from Pherae. Although we do not know the date of these marriages, 
there are reasons to place them in this period. For Jason’s sons, Nicesipolis’ marriage 
was a diplomatic success that allowed them to consolidate their position.73
Genuine power after Alexander’s death was probably assumed by the elder of the 
brothers, Tisiphonus. The scholia on Aristides’ speeches contain a reference saying that 
it was he who sent the ships to support the Theban operation on Euboea.74 This was an 
intervention in an internal conflict that engulfed the island in 358/357 and gave the The-
bans a pretext to take full control of the island. At least this was how the Athenians saw 
the events, responding remarkably decisively. They dispatched warships and land forces 
to the island, which after 30 days of fighting forced the Thebans to retreat. Euboea fell 
into the hands of the Athenians and their allies.75 By sending his fleet just after coming 
to power, Tisiphonus demonstrated his loyalty to the Thebans and determination to pre-
serve the alliance that bound them with Alexander. This provides us with a final confir-
mation that the Pheraean fleet was still capable of undertaking offensive actions. We can 
therefore assume that in previous seasons it carried out missions justifying maintaining 
ships in battle readiness, despite the limited resources Alexander had at his disposal. At 
the beginning of his reign, therefore, Tisophonus had to find money not only to pay mer-
cenaries, but also to meet the costs of the military expedition, unless these were borne by 
the Thebans. It is possible that the aforementioned issue of bronze coins was connected 
to these actions.
The reconstruction of events presented above suggests that the continuity of the al-
liance between the Boeotians and the Pheraeans was preserved. A different reconstruc-
tion seems to be demonstrated by Isocrates’ letter to Jason’s sons. The author points 
out the obstacles preventing him from accepting the invitation to settle alongside them 
and expresses the concern that the alliance formed with Athens would soon be broken 
(ὁρῶ γὰρ τὰς συμμαχίας τὰς πρὸς αὐτὴν γιγνομένας ταχέως διαλυομένας).76 The logical 
73  Satyrus ap. Athen. 13.567c; Tronson 1984, 121–122; Badian 1999, 112. Some prefer to date Philip’s 
marriage with Nicesipolis after the Battle of Crocus Field and the overthrow of the tyranny in Pherae for 
example: Griffith 1979, 278; Worthington 2008, 64–65.
74  Scholia ad Aristid. Panathen. (ed. Dindorf, vol. III), p. 298.
75  Dem. 8.74; 18.74; Aeschin. 3.85; Diod. 16.7.2; Sealey 1993, 102–103.
76  Isocr. Ep. 6.
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conclusion to be drawn is that at the moment when the letter was written Pherae was 
in an alliance with Athens. Although it appeared fragile to the author, we do not know 
whether it was in fact ended. The key problem remains determining the date when the 
letter was sent. Since it contains warnings to the brothers to avoid the temptation to 
claim tyrannical rule, it must have been written before they did this. As we recall, in 
Diodorus’ description, after Alexander’s murder the brothers enjoyed renown as tyran-
nicides, yet later (ὕστερον) they paid off mercenaries, murdered their opponents and 
took power by force. Westlake argues that the alliance with Athens was formed just after 
Alexander’s murder, but survived only until tyrannical power was assumed, which was 
the reason why it was broken. Tisiphonus and his brothers concluded an alliance with 
Thebes at this time, which resulted in sending a fleet to Euboea. All these events must 
have taken place in the course of a few months, and at this time the alliance was twice 
reversed.77 It seems more likely that Pherae and Athens formed closer relations only in 
354. Previously, against the backdrop of conflict in the Amphictyonic Council of Delphi, 
the Thessalian League’s alliance with Athens was probably loosened. Following accusa-
tions from the Phocians of sacrilege, the Thessalians consistently supported the Thebans, 
demanding punishment of the guilty. After the outbreak of the Third Sacred War, the 
Thessalians sent their units to Phocis, but were routed in the Battle of Argolas in 354. Ja-
son’s sons decided to exploit this compromising defeat to regain leadership in Thessaly. 
They abandoned the alliance with the Thebans, who had found themselves in a difficult 
situation this year. By sending Pamenes with 5,000 hoplites to Asia, they lost their main 
attack force, which the Phocians exploited by occupying the eastern part of Boeotia 
with Orchomenos. At the same time, the Phocians apparently bribed the Thessalians 
so that the soldiers would withdraw. In these circumstances, Lycophron and Peitholaus 
made a bold move by forming an alliance with the Phocians, no doubt counting on their 
financial and military support. Presumably at this time an alliance with the Athenians 
was formed, which Isocrates mentions in his letter. His addressees must have been Lyco-
phron and Peitholaus, as the eldest of the siblings, Tisiphonus, was probably dead. The 
warnings sent to them referred not to the possible development of events in Pherae, but 
to the competition for leadership in Thessaly.78
In the new political situation, the Thessalians opposed to Pherae and their allies again 
asked Philip II for help. After capturing Methone, he invaded Thessaly and began a war 
with Lycophron and the Phocians supporting him. After the first successes, he was de-
feated in two battles fought against the Phocian forces commanded by Onomarchus.79 
Forced to retreat, Philip returned in spring 353, again mobilising the Thessalians to fight. 
His cavalry heavily outnumbered Onomarchus’ forces, and pushed them into the sea. 
The description of the battle in Diodorus suggests that it took place on lowlands by the 
sea, which are identified as Crocus Plain, near to Almiros in the Pagasetic Gulf.80
Diodorus mentions that during the sea battle, numerous Athenian warships com-
manded by Chares appeared. Some of Onomarchus’ soldiers tried to save themselves 
from the slaughter by swimming to them. According to Diodorus, the fleet sailed past 
77  Westlake 1935, 164–165.
78  See Sordi 1958, 241–243; cf. Griffith 1979, 227–228. 
79  Diod. 16.35.
80  Buckler 1989, 74–75.
Sławomir Sprawski 108
the battlefield by chance (τυχικῶς παραπλέοντος τοῦ Ἀθηναίου Χάρητος μετὰ πολλῶν 
τριήρων). Its target may have been Pagasae, which had possibly been designated as 
a rallying point for the army supporting the Pheraeans.81 If we accept this suggestion, we 
must also accept that the battle took place in a different place than the coalition partners 
expected, and perhaps this is why we do not hear of the participation of Pheraean war-
ships in these events.
The Battle of Crocus Plain determined sealed Pherae’s fate. Lycophron and Pei-
tholaus, denied the allies’ support, decided to surrender the city in exchange for per-
mission for free passage together with 2,000 mercenaries with whom they joined the 
Phocians. They no doubt abandoned Pagasae, which fell into Philip’s hands, at the same 
time. However, controversies surround the dating of the fall of Pagasae. It has been sug-
gested that it might have fallen into Philip’s hands before the battle. According to this 
version, Chares’ fleet set sail with help for Pagasae, but did not make it in time and had 
to turn back. This is why the city is named as one of those to which Athenian aid did not 
arrive on time.82 N. G. L. Hammond, meanwhile, showed on the basis of Diodorus that it 
must have taken place immediately after the fall of Methone, in autumn 354.83
After leaving Pherae, for some time Lycophron and Peitholaus retained their merce-
naries. In 352 they sent them to help the Phocian commander Phayllos, who, with the 
support of many allies, had conducted unsuccessful Boeotian campaigns.84 The same 
year, they sent to the Peloponnese a detachment of 150 soldiers as support for the Pho-
cian infantry, which took part in Archidamos’ campaign against Megapolis.85 Unfortu-
nately, we do not know what happened to the warships stationed in the port. The exiled 
brothers still had enough money to pay their mercenaries. These funds might to a large 
part have been gained from the Phocians. It is also possible that they kept a few ships, 
which they maintained when carrying out tasks supporting the Athenian fleet. We know 
that in 373 the Athenians covered the costs of maintenance of the Boeotian ships sup-
porting them.86 Even if in 353 the Athenians were able to cover the pay of the Pheraean 
sailors, loss of control of Pagasae meant not only losing the place where warships were 
stored and renovated, but also being cut off from the recruitment base for oarsmen. And 
yet we hear that at this time attracting oarsmen was a serious problem, which the Athe-
nians has been struggling with for several years.87 In these conditions, maintaining the 
ships must have been a serious challenge for Lycophron and Peitholaus. The lack of 
further mentions of the Pheraean fleet therefore suggests that it ceased to exist. 
Peitholaus, the youngest of Jason’s sons, probably returned to Pherae for a short pe-
riod. According to Diodorus, in 349/348, after his successes fighting against cities on the 
Chalkidiki peninsula, Philip II headed southwards and deposed Peitholaus from Pher-
ae. We know nothing more about these events. This mention by Diodorus has aroused 
81  Diod. 16.35.5; Buckler 1989, 74.
82  Dem. 4. 35; Beloch 1922, 268.
83  Diod. 16.31.6; Hammond 1937, 67. This proposal is based on an emendation appearing in the 
manuscript of Pagas to Pagasae, which is widely accepted. 
84  Diod. 16.37.3; Buckler 1989, 86–87.
85  Diod. 16.39.3; Buckler 1989, 90–91.
86  Dem. 49.14; Carrata Thomes 1952, 17.
87  Cawkwell 1984, 337–338.
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a great deal of controversy, and some scholars see it as an error. Doubts have been raised 
regarding the possibility of Pherae breaking free of Philip II’s rule in this year, or at least 
over whether Peitholaus really participated in these events.88 The dominant view, how-
ever, is that such a return cannot be ruled out. It is made more likely by the dissatisfaction 
that Philip II’s policy was met with in Thessaly. In mid-349, Demosthenes stated that the 
Thessalians were demanding that the king hand over Pagasae and cease the fortification 
of Magnesia, and that they intended to take away his income from ports and markets (ὡς 
οὐδὲ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς ἔτι δώσοιεν αὐτῷ καρποῦσθαι).89 Demosthenes did not 
mention the problems with Pherae, which suggests that these might have emerged after 
he gave both speeches. It has been suggested that Philip really did withdraw his garrison 
from Pagasae, making it easier for Peitholaus to return.90
Peitholaus’ return might have taken place with the support of the Athenians,91 among 
whom for a certain time he was highly regarded. Information has survived that he and 
his elder brother Lycophron received Athenian citizenship, no doubt soon after leaving 
Pherae. As allies who in the battle with Philip lost their fatherland, they found refuge in 
Athens and encountered the sympathy of the Athenians, who made an appropriate decree 
on their citizenship at the popular assembly. After some time, the Athenians’ attitude to 
the Pheraeans changed, and according to Apollodorus, Peitholaus was stripped of his 
citizenship by a court ruling.92 We do not hear of a similar decision regarding Lycophron, 
but it is likely that he was no longer alive then. We do not know how much time passed 
between these two decisions. The reasons for denying Lycophron privileges are unclear, 
but a trial was probably held over accusations that they were obtained through brib-
ery. This is suggested by one sentence from the court speech against Peitholaus and his 
brother Lycophron preserved by Aristotle: “these men used to sell you when they were 
at home, and now they have come to you here and bought you” (οὗτοι δ᾽ ὑμᾶς οἴκοι μὲν 
ὄντες ἐπώλουν, ἐλθόντες δ᾽ ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐώνηνται).93 It is also possible that the affair had 
a political basis. In 346 the Athenians concluded the Peace of Philocrates with Philip, 
abandoning their Phocian allies. Perhaps they preferred to revise their position towards 
Jason’s son on this occasion.
***
The maritime policy of the tyrants of Pherae was manifested in maintaining a fleet. For 
this to be possible, they needed the infrastructure for building and storing warships, 
financial means and wood. Control of Pagasae fulfilled the first condition. Electing Ja-
son tagus and political control over the whole of Thessaly certainly helped to fulfil the 
second. He was given access to wood by an alliance with Amyntas, king of Macedon, 
88  Sordi 1958, 358–361; Griffith 1979, 319–322.
89  Dem. 1.22, 2.11; Buckler 1989, 106–107; Badian 1999, 117–119.
90  Martin 1985, 95–99.
91  Westlake 1935, 183, note 3.
92  [Dem] 59. 91.
93  Arist. Rhet. 1410a (tr. J. H. Freese); Sordi 1958, 359; Osborne 1981, 62–63; Badian 1999, 117, 119–120. 
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concluded towards the end of his life. According to Xenophon, Jason was counting on 
obtaining wood from Macedon as a condition of development of the fleet. As long as 
there was an alliance between the Macedonian ruler and Pherae, supplies of this raw ma-
terial were possible. The alliance ended in 369 with Alexander II’s intervention against 
Alexander of Pherae. After this date, access to timber may have been more difficult.
There is no doubt that in 371 Jason had warships that he used in the Boeotian cam-
paign. The next evidence of use of the Pheraean fleet only refers to Alexander’s raids 
on the Cyclades in 362/361. We can only guess that this fleet was composed of ships 
built by Jason. If this was indeed the case, then Alexander must have footed the bill for 
maintaining this fleet for several years. Perhaps some of the costs were borne by the 
citizens of Pherae, especially if the ships were used to guarantee the safety of the port in 
Pagasae. Some of them were under Alexander’s care, like the mercenary units he pos-
sessed. According to Carrata Thomes, Alexander himself might have expanded the fleet 
after forming an alliance with Thebes in 364. As an ally, he would have used the war-
ships built on Epaminondas’ command, whose upkeep was beyond the capabilities of the 
Boeotians. The use of Boeotian hulls solved the problem of access to the timber needed 
for building new ships. If, however, Alexander inherited sufficient ships from Jason, it 
would not have been necessary to use the Boeotian ones. Although the last information 
on Alexander’s fleet refers to the year 361/360, we hear about it again just after his death. 
According to Westlake, when supporting the Thebans in 357, Peitholaus sent the same 
ships which helped Alexander to plunder the Cyclades. 94
The above caveats notwithstanding, it seems that the core of Pherae’s fleet was built 
in their greatest period, towards the end of Jason’s reign, between 373 and 370. It may 
be a coincidence, but the period between the first and last mention of this fleet is no more 
than 16 years, which corresponds approximately to the average lifespan of a Greek tri-
reme, estimated at 20 years.95
We do not have much data with which to estimate the size of the Pheraean fleet. What 
we do have available for the 4th century suggests that even the fleets of the largest pow-
ers sailing in the Aegean Sea were much smaller than those sent out in the 5th century. 
When the Athenians defeated the Spartans in 376 in the Battle of Naxos and regained 
domination at sea, Chabrias had 83 triremes under his command.96 Timotheus command-
ed 60 warships at Alyzia,97 whereas in 373 Iphikrates with great difficulty managed to 
assemble 70 ships to take to Korkyra.98 Cawkwell estimates that in the 360s BCE, the 
Athenians maintained around 40 to 50 warships in active service. The average size of 
squadrons commanded by a strategos might have been 30 ships. It was with this number 
that Timotheus sailed against Samos in 365.99 Epaminondas, challenging Athenian he-
gemony at sea in 364, is said to have convinced the Boeotians to put up 100 warships. 
According to some scholars, however, there were no more than 40 built at the time, and 
it was with these forces that Epaminondas sailed on the Aegean Sea, without seeking 
94  Westlake 1935, 113; Carrata Thomes 1952, 44.
95  Casson 1995, 90.
96  Diod. 15.34.5.
97  Xen. Hell. 5.4.63.
98  Xen. Hell. 6.2; Rutishauser 2012, 160.
99  Cawkwell 1984, 334–335.
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conflict with the main Athenian forces.100 The remaining states maintaining fleets on 
the Aegean Sea may have assembled much weaker forces. In the Battle of Naxos, the 
Spartan leader Pollis had 60 or 65 triremes under his command.101 The fleet assembled 
by the Spartans in 375 and 373 was of similar size.102 In this case, however, we hear that 
squadrons from 11 states participated in the expedition. By way of comparison, in 413, 
when the Spartans decided to assemble a fleet with their allies, it apparently amounted 
to 100 ships supplied by 12 states. Of this number, the Spartans and Boeotians provided 
35 ships each and the Corinthians 15. There were also 15 from the Locrians and Pho-
cians jointly. Seven smaller states assembled a total of 20 ships, meaning that they sent 
two or three triremes each.103 Meanwhile, in 371 Cleombrotos seized 13 Theban triremes 
stationed in Creusis on the Gulf of Corinth.104
How common it was for small Aegean states to maintain fleets is a contentious issue. 
Brun referred to the phenomenon of Aegean cities having their own fleets in the 4th cen-
tury, when the pressure from Athens was not as strong as it was in the previous century. 
An example is Peparethos, which not only maintained ships but even staged offensives 
against Halonnessos. Rutishauser, however, emphasises that we do not have information 
pointing unequivocally to the fact that the cities on the Cycladic islands had their own 
triremes. In his opinion, building and upkeeping several ships was an inefficient exer-
cise considering the major costs involved. The example of Peparethos, however, shows 
that cities could maintain single ships. These were essential for protecting trading ships 
and ports from pirate attacks. Athens sent squadrons patrolling the sea, and sometimes 
offered help to their allies, but these were relatively modest forces that did not provide 
sufficient protection. Small cities were forced to look after their own security.105 In the 
sources we find information from the second half of the 5th and first half of the 4th 
century showing that small squadrons from two to five ships were stationed in key ports 
around the Euboea to secure trading routes, as was the case with the Spartan crew in 
Oreos.106 In 404 the Athenians were allowed to retain twelve warships to protect Piraeus. 
We also know that the fleet of Rhodes at the end of the 4th century numbered at least ten 
ships.107
What might the size of the Pheraean fleet have looked like in comparison? If Jason 
indeed planned to achieve supremacy at sea, he must have counted on assembling around 
a 100 warships. These, at least, are the numbers cited in the plans for the struggle for 
hegemony suggested by Epaminondas, as well as for the fleet of states opposing the 
Athenians in the Social War.108 But it seems doubtful that Jason was able to assemble 
such a large fleet, and indeed that he even had such ambitions. The example of Epami-
nondas’ fleet, however, shows that in a short time a state without good access to timber, 
100  Beloch 1922, 197, note 4; Cawkwell 1972, 271 (Epaminondas). Contra Buckler 1985, 13–15.
101  Xen. Hell. 5.4.61; Diod. 15.34.5.
102  Xen. Hell. 5.4.65, 6.2.3; Duszyński 2016, 67–69.
103  Thuc. 8.3.2.
104  Xen. Hell. 6.4.3.
105  Brun 1993, 179–181; Rutishauser 2012, 153. Cf. Dreher 1995, 29–30, 281.
106  Xen. Hell. 5.4.56. Cf. Moreno 2007, 129–130.
107  Xen. Hell. 2.2.20; Diod. 19.77.3.
108  Epaminondas: Diod. 15.78.4, 79.1–2. The Social War: Diod. 16.21.2.
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an excessive amount of money or any great seafaring traditions was able to put together 
a significant fleet. If the Boeotians did this, then Jason too might have conducted a simi-
lar programme. When he set off for Boeotia in 371, he must certainly have had more 
ships at his disposal than those necessary for protecting the port in Pagasae.
The warships built by Jason were seized by Alexander and used for the attacks on the 
Cyclades.109 According to Cawkwell, Alexander’s fleet, like Philip II’s, was not a large 
one.110 Unfortunately, we know little about the size of the Macedonian fleet during 
Philip II’s rule. In 351 it was so small that according to Demosthenes a squadron of just 
ten triremes was sufficient to deal with it. Griffith maintains that “his effective naval 
strength still did not exceed about twenty triremes altogether.”111 During the siege of 
Panormos, the three ships sent back by the Athenians gave Alexander enough of an ad-
vantage to mount an attack. During this attack, he took control of five Athenian warships 
and one from Peparethos. Before the battle, therefore, his opponent’s fleet consisted of 
at least nine ships. Alexander may therefore have had a similarly sized fleet, since he did 
not opt for a confrontation immediately. It may be that he preferred not to engage all his 
powers to avoid leaving Pagasae without protection. With this information in mind, as 
well as data about the size of the forces assembled by other Greek states, we can assume 
that Alexander’s maritime forces may have numbered around 20 warships. This was 
a fleet that was able to provide Pagasae with effective protection, take part in the escort 
of trading ships, and possibly involve itself in pirate attacks.112 Alexander could make 
raids on the Cyclades with smaller forces, without forcing the Athenians to make more 
decisive steps. Small squadrons were enough for achieving the objective, and their main-
tenance costs did not exceed his current possibilities. We know that such raids, perhaps 
also from Pagasae, were made by Philip II’s fleet towards the end of the 350s, demanding 
a ransom on the ships leaving Cape Gerastos, or attacking Lemnos and Imbros, and even 
the Attica coast near to Marathon.113 This was too small a fleet to join the competition for 
domination at sea, but Alexander did not really display such ambitions.
In a declaration quoted by Xenophon, Jason argued that Thessaly united under his 
leadership would be able to build and man more warships than the Athenians could. He 
also announced that he would be unwilling to form an alliance with them, although they 
were ready to do so. Xenophon seems to present Jason as if he indeed challenged the 
Athenians to a competition for dominion at sea. In the source evidence, however, it is 
hard to find confirmation of this theory.
Analysis of the relations between Pherae and Athens over around three decades leads 
to the conclusion that neither state was particularly concerned about their mutual rela-
tions. After Jason’s death, only in 367 did Alexander bring about an alliance, which re-
sulted in him receiving military aid. Throughout the entire period, this is the only attested 
example of an Athenian intervention in Thessaly. We also have no confirmation that 
the two parties worked together in subsequent years, despite the emergence of various 
109  Westlake (1935, 112–113) was sceptical about the size of Jason’s fleet.
110  Cawkwell 1981, 48, note 32.
111  Dem. 4.22; Polyaenus 4.2.22; Griffith 1979, 311–312; Müller 2020, 233–234.
112  For more on the subject of escorts (phylake) for trading ships provided for a fee by the Athenians, see 
Dem. 8.24–25; Gabrielsen 2001, 233
113  Dem. 4.34; Griffith 1979, 311.
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threats to both their positions. Consequently, Alexander was forced to form an alliance 
with Thebes, becoming an extremely troublesome enemy of Athens. To halt his maritime 
expeditions, the Athenians formed an alliance with the Thessalian League, yet this did 
not last too long. In 354 Jason’s sons united with the Phocians, who were supported by 
the Athenians. We do not hear of any direct collaboration between them, but the tyrants 
expelled from Pherae found refuge in Athens. This alone might give us the impression 
that Pherae did not play a particularly important role in Athenian politics. In the 360s and 
350s, an alliance with its leaders was mainly useful for counteracting Theban influences. 
Yet the Athenians did not demonstrate any particular engagement in this region. In the 
case of the Pheraean tyrants, paradoxically we have more evidence of their cooperation 
with the Thebans, who, after all, were instrumental in the collapse of Alexander’s posi-
tion in Thessaly in 364. His conflict with Thebes was short-lived, however. Armed help 
was given to Thebes by Jason in 371, Polyphron in 369, Alexander in 362 and Peitholaus 
in 357. To this we can also add the Pheraeans’ participation in battles with the Phocians 
on the Theban side in 354.
We can get a slightly different picture of the mutual relations if we concentrate on the 
Pheraean rulers’ contacts with Athens. Jason, who declined to form an alliance, visited 
the city to take part in the trial of Timotheus. Alexander, having formed an alliance, en-
joyed such acclaim among the Athenians that they erected a monument to him. Finally, 
Lycophron and Peitholaus, stripped of power and exiled from Pherae, were honoured by 
being awarded Athenian citizenship. These examples seem to demonstrate that the Pher-
aean leaders’ personal relations with Athens were much more intensive than analysis of 
the political relations between them might suggest. Perhaps the reasons for this state 
of affairs should be sought in their business relations, suggesting that it would be useful 
to analyse the evidence referring to sea trading between Pagasae and Piraeus and the role 
the Pheraean tyrants played in it. These issues will be the subject of a separate paper.114
Abbreviations
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